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Kite: IRS Wins QTIP Battle
But Loses Annuity War
By Kerry A. Ryan
In Estate of Kite v. Commissioner,1 the Tax Court
decided several issues regarding a complex estate
plan designed to minimize (or escape entirely) the
reach of the federal income, gift, and estate taxes.
Virginia Kite came from a wealthy Oklahoma bank-
ing family. Her husband, James Kite, predeceased
her, and she never remarried. She died on April 28,
2004, survived by her three children. During her
lifetime, Virginia Kite was the income beneficiary of
several trusts, four of which were at issue in the
case: two qualified terminable interest property
trusts2 (QTIP trusts 1 and 2), a marital deduction
trust qualifying under section 2056(b)(5) (LEPA
trust), and a lifetime revocable trust. The opinion
addresses some of the gift and estate tax conse-
quences of a complicated series of transactions that
culminated in the assets of the three former trusts
being transferred to Virginia Kite’s revocable trust,
and sold by that trust to her children for three
deferred private annuity agreements. This article
will focus on four issues concerning the application
of sections 1014(e), 2511, 2512, and 2519 to the Kite
facts.
James Kite’s Estate: Section 1014(e)?
The first issue raised by the case concerns a
transaction engaged in before James Kite’s death.
On February 15, 1995, Virginia Kite created an inter
vivos QTIP trust (QTIP Trust 1) naming her husband
as sole income beneficiary for his life. Virginia Kite
retained a secondary life estate in the trust, with the
remainder to be distributed to three trusts, one for
each of the Kite children. Virginia Kite gifted com-
mon stock in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. (OG&E)
to the trust and made a valid QTIP election.3 As a
result, the transfer qualified for the marital deduc-
tion and generated no gift tax liability for Virginia
Kite. James Kite died one week after the creation of
QTIP Trust 1. Although under section 2044, the
value of QTIP Trust 1 was included in James Kite’s
estate, his executor made a valid QTIP election and,
consequently, the trust’s assets also avoided tax in
his estate.
The short duration of James Kite’s interest in the
trust raises an issue regarding its purpose. The most
common purpose of an inter vivos QTIP trust is to
maximize the use of both spouses’ effective transfer
tax exemption amounts.4 By creating such a trust, a
wealthier spouse can fund a poorer spouse’s appli-
cable exclusion amount without generating any
transfer tax liability for either spouse. Interestingly,
that did not seem to be Virginia Kite’s intention in
creating the lifetime QTIP trust. The opinion notes
that James Kite died with a gross estate of approxi-
mately $15 million and zero federal estate tax
liability after the marital deduction. QTIP Trust 1
received about $4 million of his estate assets. His
executor allocated the remainder of the estate to
two separate trusts as follows: (1) about $1 million
to QTIP Trust 25; and (2) approximately $10 million




4See generally sections 2010(c) and 2505.
5The executor funded the trust with assets equal to James
Kite’s available generation-skipping transfer tax exemption
under section 2631. Presumably, the executor made an election
under section 2652(a)(3) to treat James Kite as the transferor of
the QTIP for purposes of the GSTT (reverse QTIP election).
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it appears that James Kite did not need the assets in
QTIP Trust 1 to fund his effective exemption
amount.6
Rather than transfer tax savings, it appears that
Virginia Kite intended to (and did actually) procure
an income tax benefit by creating QTIP Trust 1
immediately before her husband’s death.7 While the
value of the OG&E stock used to fund the trust was
approximately $4 million, its income tax basis was
only $41,028. At its creation, QTIP Trust 1 acquired
Virginia Kite’s basis in the stock under section 1015.
However, upon James Kite’s death one week later,8
the inclusion of the trust assets in his gross estate
under section 2044 resulted in a step-up in basis
under section 1014 to the stock’s date of death value
(about $4 million).9
A question not addressed by the court (and
presumably not raised by the IRS) is whether sec-
tion 1014(e) does or should apply in that circum-
stance. Section 1014(e) provides that if (1)
appreciated property was acquired by the decedent
by gift during the one-year period ending on the
date of the decedent’s death, and (2) that property
was acquired from the decedent by (or passes from
the decedent to) the donor of that property, the basis
of the property in the hands of the donor shall be
the adjusted basis of the decedent immediately
before death.10 Congress enacted section 1014(e) as
part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the
same act that created the unlimited marital deduc-
tion for gift and estate tax purposes. Congress was
concerned that a transfer tax free interspousal flow
of assets would increase incentives to engage in
deathbed transfers of appreciated property between
spouses to receive a basis increase at death.11 Con-
gress believed ‘‘that allowing a stepped-up basis in
this situation permit[ted] unintended and inappro-
priate tax benefits.’’12
It is unclear if or how section 1014(e) applies in
the Kite scenario.13 Although the statute was en-
acted in 1981, Treasury has yet to promulgate
regulations under section 1014(e). An argument
exists that section 1014(e) should apply in that
situation to bar any basis step-up in the stock.14
While the statutory language seemingly contem-
plates successive outright interspousal transfers,
the legislative history supports a broader applica-
tion to near-death interspousal transfers in trust.15 If
section 1014(e) applied in Kite, the basis of the assets
in QTIP Trust 1 after James Kite’s death would be
the same as his adjusted basis immediately before
death, or $41,028. An alternative approach, one
adopted by the IRS in a private letter ruling, is that
section 1014(e) should deny a step-up in basis to
only a portion of the trust — Virginia Kite’s income
interest.16 Under that view, Virginia Kite gave an
income interest in QTIP Trust 1 to her husband, and
within one year, she got back an income interest in
the same trust at his death. By negative inference,
Kite provides support for a third position — namely,
that section 1014(e) does not apply at all to near-
death interspousal transfers in trust.
Annuity Transaction — Gift or Sale?
On December 31, 1996, all of Virginia Kite’s trusts
formed a limited partnership.17 In 1997, as the
trustee of her trusts, she gifted about one-third of
the limited partnership interests to her children. In
1998 the entity reorganized in Texas by merging
into Baldwin Limited Partnership (Baldwin LP).18
6From 1987 to 1995, the applicable exclusion amount was
$600,000 (subject to a phaseout for large estates). See section
2010(c) (before 1997 amendment).
7A footnote in the opinion confirms that the OG&E stock
obtained a step-up in basis under section 1014. Kite, T.C. Memo.
2013-43, at *8, n.9.
8The opinion does not explicitly mention the state of Mr.
Kite’s health immediately before his death.
9Section 1014(b)(10).
10Appreciated property is defined as ‘‘any property if the fair
market value of such property on the day it was transferred to
the decedent by gift exceeds its adjusted basis.’’ Section
1014(e)(2)(A).
11H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 188-189 (1981).
12Id. at 188 (note that the original bill provided for a
three-year lookback period before death).
13Accord Kathryn G. Henkel, Estate Planning & Wealth Pres-
ervation: Strategies and Solutions, para. 44.20[2] (2013).
14Accord Jeffrey Pennell, ‘‘Jeff Pennell on Estate of Kite: Will it
Fly?’’ Estate Planning Newsletter No. 2062, Leimberg Information
Services Inc. (Feb. 11, 2013).
15See Mark R. Siegel, ‘‘I.R.C. Section 1014(e) and Gifted
Property Reconvened in Trust,’’ 27 Akron Tax J. 33, 45-49 (2012)
(arguing that the statutory language contemplates transfers in
trust and the legislative history ‘‘evidences congressional con-
cern for transfers directly or indirectly from the donee-decedent
back to the donor’’).
16LTR 9321050 (the IRS ruled, in circumstances similar to
Kite, that section 1014(e) applied only to the surviving spouse’s
income interest only and that the trust’s remainder interest
qualified for a basis step-up). Accord Siegel, supra note 15, at
50-53 (detailing how partial application of section 1014(e) would
apply to interspousal transfers in trust).
17Easterly Corp., an Oklahoma corporation wholly owned by
Virginia Kite and the Kite children (individually or through
trusts), was the general partner.
18Easterly Corp. also reorganized in Texas (the court indi-
cated that Texas provided a more advantageous state tax
jurisdiction than Oklahoma).
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In May 1998 Virginia Kite’s trusts sold their remain-
ing interests in Baldwin LP to her children for
several promissory notes (Baldwin notes).19 On
December 31, 2000, Virginia Kite’s trusts contrib-
uted the Baldwin notes to Kite Family Investment
Company (KIC), a Texas general partnership, in
return for a 99 percent interest in the entity.20
In January 2001 Virginia Kite’s attorney21 met
with the Kite children to discuss a proposed sale of
their mother’s interest in KIC (owned by her trusts)
to her children for three deferred private annuity
agreements.22 Under the annuities, the first pay-
ment would be due 10 years after the effective date
of the agreement. The attorney advised that if
Virginia Kite died within the deferral period, her
annuity interest would terminate, and as a result,
her interest in KIC (owned by the trusts) should
avoid estate taxation. However, if she survived the
deferral period, each Kite child would be personally
liable for an almost $2 million annual annuity
payment. The court noted that the children’s per-
sonal assets could sustain only three years of annu-
ity payments; thereafter, the children would be
insolvent.
In March 2001 the parties agreed to move for-
ward with the annuity sale. The transaction oc-
curred in three steps. On March 28, 2001, Virginia
Kite replaced the trustees of the three marital trusts
(QTIP trusts 1 and 2 and the LEPA trust) with the
Kite children, retroactively effective as of January 1,
2001. The children, as trustees, terminated the three
trusts (as of January 1, 2001) and distributed the
trusts’ assets (consisting of a 99 percent interest in
KIC) to their mother’s revocable trust. On March 30,
2001, Virginia Kite’s revocable trust sold its entire
remaining interest in KIC to her children for three
unsecured 10-year deferred private annuities. Vir-
ginia Kite died on April 28, 2004, before receiving
any annuity payments. The executor did not in-
clude the value of the KIC interest in Mrs. Kite’s
gross estate. The IRS issued gift tax and estate tax
notices of deficiency of about $6 million and $5.1
million, respectively. The court consolidated the gift
and estate tax cases for trial.23
The Tax Court respected the exchange of the
partnership interests for the annuities as a valid sale
— not a disguised gift — even though Virginia Kite
died before the first annuity payment was due. The
government first argued that the annuities failed to
provide adequate and full consideration for the
transfer of the KIC interests. Under normal gift tax
rules, if the value of the property transferred ex-
ceeds the value of that received in an exchange, the
excess will be considered a taxable gift.24 The IRS
alleged that the estate improperly used the section
7520 actuarial tables to value the annuities, because
Virginia Kite’s age and the compromised state of
her health made her death within 10 years foresee-
able.25 The government relied on evidence that she
received 24-hour home healthcare from 2001 until
her death.26
At the time of the annuity transaction, Virginia
Kite was 75 years old, with an actuarial life expec-
tancy of 12.5 years. The regulations allowed her to
use the section 7520 actuarial tables if she was not
terminally ill at the time of the transaction.27 The
regulations define terminal illness as an incurable
illness or other deteriorating physical condition,
with at least a 50 percent chance of death within a
year. Survival for at least 18 months raises a pre-
sumption of a lack of terminal illness at the time the
transaction was entered into, unless the contrary is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
In deciding whether to engage in the annuity
transaction, Virginia Kite met with her physician,
who sent her a letter concluding that she was not
terminally ill ‘‘and that there is at least a 50 percent
probability that she will survive for 18 months or
longer.’’28 The estate also cited McLendon v. Commis-
sioner,29 in which the Fifth Circuit held that a
terminally ill cancer patient, with a physician-
certified 10 percent chance of surviving more than a
year, was not terminally ill for purposes of using the
section 7520 actuarial tables to value a private
annuity. Based on the physician’s note and the
19The notes were secured, fully recourse promissory notes,
payable over a 15-year period, with interest accruing at a rate of
5.81 percent per year. Annual note payments (principal and
interest) totaled about $1 million per year.
20Easterly Corp., the corporate general partner of Baldwin
LP, contributed the remaining 1 percent and also served as
manager.
21According to the court, the attorney represented both sides
of the proposed transaction, serving as counsel to Virginia Kite
and counsel to each of the Kite children. Kite, T.C. Memo.
2013-43, at *13, n.7.
22The attorney described the proposed transaction as an
estate planning tool.
23Judge Elizabeth Crewson Paris recently issued an order
severing the two cases from consolidation after receiving briefs
on the Rule 155 determination. See Estate of Kite v. Commissioner,
Nos. 6772-08 and 6773-08 (T.C. Oct. 22, 2013).
24See sections 2511 and 2512, and reg. section 25.1512-8.
25All parties agreed that if the use of the section 7520 tables
was valid, the estate correctly calculated the value of the
annuities.
26The IRS also cited her income tax returns, showing in-
creased medical costs, for the years at issue.
27Reg. section 1.7520-3(b)(3).
28Kite, T.C. Memo. 2013-43, at *15.
29135 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1998).
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favorable McLendon decision, the Kite court deter-
mined that ‘‘Mrs. Kite was not precluded from
relying on the IRS actuarial tables to value the
annuity transaction.’’30
The government also argued that the annuity
transaction was illusory. The court interpreted that
as an argument that the sale was not bona fide,
citing Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner.31 In Bongard,
the Tax Court interpreted a bona fide sale as one at
arm’s length.32 Using this standard, the Kite court
held that the annuity transaction was a bona fide
sale and not illusory. In doing so, it distinguished
the Kite facts from those in Estate of Hurford v.
Commissioner.33 In Hurford, the court held that the
transfer of a surviving spouse’s interest in a family
limited partnership to her children for a private
annuity was not bona fide because: (1) the surviving
spouse had stage 3 liver cancer at the time; (2) the
parties intended to ignore the agreements; and (3)
the children did not have sufficient assets outside
the FLP with which to make the annuity payments.
Unlike in Hurford, in Kite, the annuity agreements
were enforceable and the children demonstrated
their intention to comply with its terms.34 The court
cited a contribution to capital by Baldwin LP to KIC
immediately before the annuity transaction as evi-
dence that the children did not plan to rely solely on
the existing assets in KIC to make the annuity
payments. Further, the children did not take any
distributions after the transaction, allowing the KIC
assets to accumulate in order to provide liquidity
for future annuity payments.
The Tax Court also determined that Virginia Kite
intended to demand compliance and operated with
a profit motive. The court cited her business acu-
men and active participation in her finances over
the years. Unlike the surviving spouse in Hurford,
Virginia Kite did not have cancer or any other
terminal illness. Further, she did not need the KIC
assets to live on. Before engaging in the transaction,
she received assurances from the administrators of
her various trusts that her personal assets could
sustain her without the income from KIC. Accord-
ingly, the Tax Court held that the annuity transac-
tion was a bona fide sale, not a disguised gift.35
Section 2519 Disposition?
A QTIP election allows a marital deduction for
the entire value of property passing to a trust, even
though the surviving spouse has only a qualifying
income interest for life.36 The corollary to this
deduction is that the statute includes the trust
property in the surviving spouse’s estate37 or gift
tax38 base, although the spouse does not own the
trust or control its ultimate disposition.39 In that
manner, the government is assured that the transfer
tax avoided in the predeceased spouse’s estate is
collected in the surviving spouse’s estate.
If the surviving spouse disposes of all or a part of
her qualifying income interest, section 2519 treats it
as a transfer of all interests in that property other
than the qualifying income interest.40 The Kite court
grappled with the term ‘‘disposition’’ for purposes
of section 2519. Under the regulations, a conversion
of the QTIP property into other property in which
the surviving spouse has a qualifying income inter-
est for life is not a disposition.41 Accordingly, the
court found that the exchanges of QTIP assets in
1996 (for limited partnership interests), January
1998 (for Baldwin LP interests), May 1998 (for
Baldwin notes), and 2000 (for KIC interests) were
not section 2519 dispositions, because Virginia Kite
continued to hold a qualifying income interest in
the converted assets.
The Tax Court also determined that Virginia
Kite’s 1997 gift of a portion of the limited partner-
ship interests owned by the marital trusts (includ-
ing the QTIP trusts) to her children did not upset
the deferral regime inherent in marital deduction
rules. According to the court, ‘‘the QTIP trust assets,
which avoided tax when transferred to the QTIP
trusts upon Mr. Kite’s death . . . [were] now taxable
when transferred by Mrs. Kite’’ to her children.42
Why did section 2519 not apply to this partial
disposition of Virginia Kite’s qualifying income
interest? In transferring principal as a gift to her
children, she also transferred an associated part of
30Kite, T.C. Memo. 2013-43, at *24.
31124 T.C. 95 (2005). The court’s interpretation is an interest-
ing analytical move. Bongard interpreted the section 2036 statu-
tory exception for bona fide sales ‘‘for an adequate and full
consideration.’’ As noted by Steve Akers of Bessemer Trust,
‘‘there is not similar statutory language in section 2511, the gift
tax statute.’’ See Akers, ‘‘Estate of Kite v. Commissioner, T.C.




32Bongard, 124 T.C. at 123.
33T.C. Memo. 2008-278.





39Although there is a right of recovery for any gift or estate
tax paid by the surviving spouse (or the surviving spouse’s
estate) from the person receiving the property. See section 2207A
and reg. section 2207A-1.
40Alternatively, if the surviving spouse enjoys the qualifying
income interest until death, the property will be included in that
spouse’s gross estate. See section 2044.
41Reg. section 25.2519-1(f).
42Id. at *37-*38.
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her qualifying income interest.43 Presumably, the
court interpreted the trust instruments in a manner
that authorized the distribution of principal to
Virginia Kite, who then, as owner, chose to gift the
distributed property to her children.44 In that case,
section 2519 would not apply.45
The Tax Court did, however, find a section 2519
disposition in the annuity transaction. As stated
above, in 2001 Virginia Kite appointed her children
as trustees of the QTIP trusts, who then immedi-
ately terminated the marital trusts and transferred
the assets (consisting of KIC interests) to their
mother’s revocable trust.46 Virginia Kite’s revocable
trust then sold all its KIC interests to the Kite
children. The court viewed those events as a single
integrated transaction, wherein the assets of the
QTIP trusts were sold to the children in exchange
for deferred annuity agreements. Under the inte-
grated view, the court held that the sale of the QTIP
assets was a disposition of Virginia Kite’s qualifying
income interest for purposes of section 2519. As a
result, there was a transfer of the underlying prop-
erty subject to the qualifying income interest (less
the value of the qualifying income interest). The
court noted that ‘‘because Mrs. Kite received ad-
equate and full consideration for her income inter-
est in KIC, she did not make a gift of her qualifying
income interest for life under section 2511.’’47
The Tax Court did not address the gift tax
consequences of the section 2519 deemed transfer of
the remainder interest in KIC. Several commenta-
tors argued that if the annuities were adequate and
full consideration for the entire KIC interest (which
the court previously held), there was no gift tax
triggered on the deemed section 2519 transfer.48
Recently, Judge Elizabeth Crewson Paris deter-
mined that Virginia Kite’s gift tax deficiency for tax
year 2001 was $816,206.49 The court emphasized
that the termination of the QTIP trusts triggered
section 2519.50 It viewed the annuity transaction as
‘‘an intermediary step between terminating the
QTIP trusts and selling the QTIP trust assets to the
Kite children designed to circumvent the QTIP
regime.’’51 Accordingly, that Virginia Kite received
adequate consideration in the annuity transaction
had no bearing on the fullness of consideration for
the actual disposition of the qualifying income
interest and deemed transfer of the remainder in-
terest. According to the court, upon a section 2519
disposition, a surviving spouse can never receive
adequate and full consideration for the remainder
interest because it ‘‘is a future interest held by the
remainderman and not the surviving spouse, and
therefore cannot be transferred by the surviving
spouse for consideration.’’52
Gift From Kite Children to Virginia Kite?
In a footnote citing LTR 9908033, the court men-
tioned the possibility that the termination of the
QTIP trusts, and the subsequent liquidation of the
trusts’ assets in favor of Virginia Kite’s revocable
trust, may be a gift from the Kite children (as
remaindermen) to their mother (as income benefi-
ciary). In that private letter ruling, the surviving
spouse, remainder beneficiaries (children), and
trustee intended to terminate a QTIP trust and
distribute its entire corpus to the surviving spouse,
free of the trust. The IRS concluded that the pro-
posed transfer would be a gift from the children to
the surviving spouse. It argued that the children
proposed to transfer a valuable property interest to
the surviving spouse for less than adequate and full
consideration, in a manner that would deplete their
gross estate.
The children in the private letter ruling argued
that under Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541, a remain-
der interest in a QTIP trust is treated as already
owned by the spouse for transfer tax purposes, so a
transfer to the spouse should not be treated as a gift.
43The tax consequences of viewing this as a partial disposi-
tion of Virginia Kite’s qualifying income interest for life would
be quite harsh. See reg. section 25.2519-1(g), Example 4. Section
2511 would tax the actuarial value of the income portion of the
actual gifted property. Section 2519 would tax the entire remain-
der interest in the trust property. Section 2702 would value the
retained income interest at zero, because the deemed transfer of
the remainder interest is to her children, who are family
members. As a result, the value of the section 2519 transfer
would be increased by the amount of the retained income
interest. Section 2036 would include a portion of the trust corpus
in Virginia Kite’s gross estate, if she held the retained income
interest until death.
44Because Virginia Kite was the trustee, it is likely that the
power to distribute principal to herself was limited to avoid its
being considered a general power of appointment under sec-
tions 2514 and 2041.
45See reg. section 25.2519-1(e).
46The IRS argued that this was a breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of the children as trustees; however, the court expressed
reluctance ‘‘to question the Kite children’s discretion, as trust-
ees, to terminate the trusts pursuant to the terms of the trust
agreements.’’ Kite, T.C. Memo. 2013-43, at *39, n.36. Presumably,
the court was referring to the power of the trustee ‘‘to terminate
the trust at any time when, in the judgment of the trustee, the
trust corpus was too small to justify management as a trust, or
the trust should otherwise be terminated.’’ Id. at *6.
47Id. at *43.
48See Akers, supra note 31, and Pennell, supra note 14 (both
suggesting that this would be the result in the Rule 155
determination).
49See Kite, No. 6772-08 (T.C. Oct. 25, 2013) (order and decision
under Tax Court Rule 155).
50The court cited Rev. Rul. 98-8 as support for this proposi-
tion.
51Kite, T.C. Memo. 2013-43, at *41.
52Id.
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In Rev. Rul. 98-8, a surviving spouse purchased a
remainder interest in a QTIP trust by issuing a
promissory note equal to the actuarial value of the
remainder interest to the remainderman, and then
the trust terminated and the entire corpus was paid
to the spouse, who then used those assets to pay off
the note. The ruling concluded that the surviving
spouse made a gift of property equal to the value of
the remainder interest in the QTIP trust. The IRS
theorized that the surviving spouse acquired an
asset (the remainder interest in the QTIP trust) that
was already subject to inclusion in the surviving
spouse’s transfer tax base. The ruling stated that
‘‘the receipt of an asset that does not effectively
increase the value of the recipient’s gross estate
does not constitute adequate consideration for pur-
poses of the gift and estate tax.’’53
In LTR 9908033, the IRS distinguished Rev. Rul.
98-8 by noting ‘‘the fact that the receipt of the
remainder interest by the [s]pouse will not increase
the value of her potential taxable estate [and hence
is not adequate consideration for her transfer to the
remainderman] is not pertinent to the determina-
tion of the Federal gift tax consequences to the
[s]pouse’s children upon transfer of their remainder
interest to the surviving spouse for no consider-
ation.’’ If the children gratuitously transferred their
interest to a non-spouse recipient, the transfer
would be a gift. According to the IRS, the result is
the same if the donee is the surviving spouse.
Although the Service did not raise this issue in Kite,
it certainly exists as a lurking threat for other
taxpayers contemplating similar transactions.
Conclusion
In the Tax Court proceeding, the IRS only raised
two of the four issues discussed in this commentary.
That alone may be viewed as a taxpayer victory.
Further, the court’s holding that the deferred annui-
ties constituted adequate and full consideration for
the KIC interests is clearly a taxpayer win. Although
the taxpayer ultimately lost on the gift tax conse-
quences of the deemed transfer under section 2519,
that included only $1,484,011 in Virginia Kite’s
transfer tax base. Assuming there is no further
estate tax imposed,54 the annuity transaction effec-
tively excluded $9,121,267 from her estate.55
53Citing Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); and
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
54The Tax Court has not yet determined the amount of any
estate tax liability under Rule 155.
55The total value of Virginia Kite’s 99 percent interest in KIC
transferred by her revocable trust was $10,605,278, according to
the court.
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